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The present financial crisis has led to a rethink of op-
timal structures for regulation and supervision.It has
not been simply that deficiencies in both supervision
and regulation have contributed to the crisis but that
the structure of how international financial institu-
tions are regulated and supervised by various groups
of national authorities makes it more difficult both to
reduce the chance of financial problems and to han-
dle them when they occur. None of this has come as
a surprise, but until the recent difficulties the prob-
lem had to a large extent been theoretical and not,
fortunately, demonstrated in practice. Now it has
been.This article therefore explores how it might be
possible to improve the framework, particularly in
Europe.An opportunity now exists for changes to be
implemented as there is a political will to take action
to avoid getting into the same difficulties again.
The problem at the national level
As illustrated by the recent de Larosière Group
Report (2009), current thinking is that two main ac-
tivities are needed to try to ensure the continued
maintenance of financial stability. The first is try to
ensure that individual financial institutions are pru-
dentially run and second to try to establish where the
threats to the stability of the financial system lie and
how they can best be addressed.The present crisis has
shown that both activities had important deficiencies,
such as inadequate attention to leverage, liquidity
and the procyclicality of capital requirements but the
concern here is whether the structure of how these
activities were organised was a contributor to the
problem.
However an integral part of the problem of effective
supervision and regulation is the ability to handle
problems when they occur.This has also been seen to
be weak and, while acknowledging it, neither the de
Larosière report nor the Turner Review (2009) has
come up with clear proposals for action. If financial
institutions can expect to be bailed out if they en-
counter severe difficulties – especially if they are
large or many banks face the same problem at the
same time, it will be more difficult to persuade them
to manage their risks as carefully as they might if
shareholders’ funds and directors’ jobs were fully ex-
posed.Thus if what happens in problem times is not
addressed,setting up new structures to handle normal
(“good”) times may not be very effective. The insti-
tutions responsible for resolving problems and for en-
suring that the safety net operates swiftly and effec-
tively need to have objectives,responsibilities and an
incentive structure that is compatible with prudence
practised by financial institutions in normal times,not
one that runs in the opposite direction as is frequently
the case at present (Eisenbeis 2004). Having just
bailed out several banks, as in previous crises, it will
be even more difficult for the authorities to establish
a believable regime that will make it clear that next
time will be different and those responsible for tak-
ing the risks must absorb them, not the taxpayer.
Macro- and micro-supervisory structures
Despite the massive size of the crisis it is not clear
that major changes are required to the structure of
national regulation and supervision in good times but
rather to how the supervision is carried out.Mayes et
al.(2009) contains a wide range of suggestions,for ex-
ample. It is clear that in some countries supervisors
were too weak compared to those that they super-
vised and that there was a degree of regulatory cap-
ture. There have been clear problems in the United
States with inadequate supervision outside the realm
of traditional banking,indicating that the range of su-
pervision needs to be extended. However, the com-
plexity of the US system has been largely a facet of
* University of Auckland.history and is not repeated in most other OECD
countries.It is a very clear lesson to the EU countries
in their approach to a single financial market that
they too should not create a complex structure as they
move steadily towards a single financial market and
the continuing removal of barriers to integration.This
would be all too easy,as existing authorities quite nat-
urally do not want to give up their powers,and hence
new organisations will have inevitable overlap and
opportunities for conflict.
Moreover,much of the difficulty has been a collective
international one, with Basel Committee standards
proving to be inadequate.Therefore,although the cri-
sis may have been centred in the US, there is still a
need for all countries to address the failings in su-
pervisory and regulatory standards. It is not surpris-
ing therefore that the G-20 has decided to try to im-
prove the international framework,strengthening the
Financial Stability Forum to form the Financial
Stability Board. Nevertheless it is still the responsi-
bility of each country to improve its own institutions,
even though international advice and assistance will
be of considerable value.
While the existing national individual organisations
can be improved and responsibilities realigned
among them to reflect the recent experience, it will
always be difficult to recruit the best staff because of
the salary differential with those who are being su-
pervised. Regulatory and supervisory structures
therefore have to reflect the realities and not be
based on the belief that the authorities can always be
one step ahead of the financial system.They will tend
to be one step behind and an attempt to change this
is only likely to be successful if it clearly inhibits in-
novation and the growth of the industry.Hence there
has to be a balance between trying to avoid problems
and clearing up those that occur swiftly with little
harm to financial stability.
There has been a general tendency towards two struc-
tures for supervision and regulation, one being a re-
sponsibility for overall financial stability assigned to
the central bank and the other a unifying of respon-
sibility for supervision of the financial sector. Both
trends are a reflection of experience and a reaction
to developments in the market, where the main fi-
nancial institutions are involved in most sectors.
These trends make the organisations for both macro-
prudential and micro-prudential supervision stronger
and more expert. However, there is no universal
recipe and it is clear that the size of the country mat-
ters. Small countries in particular find it difficult to
support a number of organisations and it is argued
that separating supervision from the central bank in
Iceland was one of the contributory factors to their
problems (Jännäri 2009).
There is a long-standing argument about whether
central banks should be involved in supervision but
it is clear from the present crisis that central banks
need to be well informed about the health and activ-
ities of the individual institutions that comprise the fi-
nancial system. Solutions such as those applied in
Finland and Estonia, for example, involving a very
close relationship between the two organisations and
with extensive common facilities may well prove sat-
isfactory if full integration is rejected.
Two main arguments are advanced for separation at
the operational level. The first is that the needs of
monetary policy aimed at price stability and financial
stability may not coincide.The second is that it is not
clear that the central bank is likely to be the obvious
repository for skills in conduct of business regulation.
Countries therefore have in general chosen either to
set up an independent supervisor that combines pru-
dential and conduct of business regulation or to con-
centrate prudential supervision in the central bank
(Masciandaro and Quintyn 2007)
In some respects neither of these arguments remains
very persuasive.The crisis has emphasised that price
stability and financial stability are closely intertwined.
A major failing in the previous arrangement has been
that those responsible for overall financial stability
have lacked much in the way of powers to do any-
thing about it.The various Financial Stability Reviews
(Cihak 2006), while well constructed, had largely an
advisory role.Many of the problems of risk in the sys-
tem had been identified but neither the responsibili-
ties nor the powers for tackling them had been prop-
erly assigned. If macro-prudential regulation is to
mean anything, those responsible need tools to
achieve it. It is not clear for example how far imple-
menting the de Larosière report would go beyond
seeing that the European authorities were better in-
formed.The Eurosystem would need new powers to
act on this information.
The drawback to each country addressing the prob-
lems as it thinks fit and developing its choice of or-
ganisational structures for supervision and regulation
is that the different bodies may not fit together well
internationally.The three level 3 committees (CEBS,
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CESR and CEIOPS) are already large in order to
cope with responsibilities spread across a number of
national agencies.
Structures for the resolution of problems
The major structural deficiencies, however, have
been shown to lie in the field of problem correction.
Once problems have struck, countries have found it
difficult to respond in the way they wanted.The UK
has probably illustrated both the problem and its so-
lution most vividly with respect to large banks. But
problems with resolving small banks, such as Cus-
todia in Sweden (Riksbank 2006),have revealed that
having a smooth process that allows an institution to
close before losses mount is much more difficult than
was expected. After the financial crisis of the early
1990s Sweden carried out a thorough review of its
legislation and institutions and in 2000 produced pro-
posals to tackle this deficiency. It has taken the pre-
sent crisis to take action and implement these pro-
posals. This is an important lesson in present cir-
cumstances:authorities can readily conclude that be-
cause they were able to get through a crisis, albeit
with difficulty, they are adequately set up for the fu-
ture – aided no doubt by the feeling that they have
learnt the lessons and will not make the same mis-
takes again.
For such a regime to work well it must be possible for
the authorities to act early at the first sign of difficul-
ty and have a strictly time-bound approach that forces
them to implement a resolution before shareholder
value is totally eroded.The US, Canada and Mexico
inter alia have such a regime, labelled SEIR
(Structured Early Intervention and Resolution),
whereby it is the duty of the resolution authority to
achieve a resolution at minimum cost to itself. Since
in each case the resolution authority is the deposit in-
surer, which will be among the first to be exposed to
loss once shareholder capital has been exhausted,this
provides a clear incentive structure for Prompt
Corrective Action.In the US case a series of increas-
ingly tough measures are mandated with the FDIC
ultimately having to intervene once the leverage ra-
tio falls to 2 percent.
The UK Banking Act 2009 has identified what it must
be possible to do with a troubled bank (sect 1(3)):
• Transfer to a private sector purchaser
• Transfer to a bridge bank
• Transfer to temporary public ownership.
This entails having powers to transfer shares and
to transfer property, rights and liabilities, by acting
early while the bank still has positive value but is
not viable without resolution.1 All these can be
achieved without triggering close out clauses or oth-
er ex ante ring fencing provisions. This requirement
is key to a viable system.Ordinary insolvency will re-
sult in the interruption of many of the troubled bank’s
vital functions, which will of itself prevent a smooth
resolution.US law specifically precludes any trigger-
ing during the day that the reorganisation takes place
so there is no break in services. Furthermore, as the
Custodia and Fortis examples show, it must not be
possible for the shareholders to challenge the au-
thorities’ actions or the new arrangements will not
work and counterparties will withdraw. Proper inde-
pendently assessed compensation is obviously need-
ed to ensure there is no expropriation.
What is more contentious is the institutional struc-
ture to achieve this. If the supervisor is responsible
for resolution there is a danger of a conflict of inter-
est. If a supervisor is not responsible then there is a
problem of ensuring that the resolution agency is
properly informed. In the US, the resolution agency,
the FDIC, is also a supervisor. In Canada, the equiv-
alent organisation, the CDIC, is not a supervisor but
has a close relationship with the Office of the
Superintendent of Financial Institutions from whom
it can demand heightened supervision.In the UK,the
Bank of England is the resolution agency,with its in-
tervention triggered by the supervisor, the FSA.
Nevertheless it is clear that the resolution agency
needs to be involved at the outset of the process as
soon as there is any concern that the subject bank
may have a problem.The Bank of England has found
that it takes around two months to get a smooth res-
olution in place. Finding possible buyers takes time
even if due diligence processes are truncated with the
aid of guarantees against hidden problems.
There are multiple objectives for the Special Reso-
lution Regime in the UK:
• To protect and enhance the stability of the finan-
cial system of the UK
• To protect and enhance public confidence in the
stability of the banking systems in the UK
• To protect depositors
• To protect public funds
1 The UK FSA’s phrase is that the bank does not meet the “thresh-
old conditions” for continuing registration.• To avoid interfering with property rights in con-
travention of the European Convention of Human
Rights.
These objectives have no ordering and hence no re-
quirement simply to maximise the value of the insol-
vency estate or minimise the direct or indirect cost to
the taxpayer.This makes the prior assessment of what
will be done in any future case much less predictable.
While some argue that such ambiguity is constructive,
the less people believe there will be a taxpayer
bailout the lower the moral hazard.
The nature of the cross-border problem
The same two issues have to be addressed for cross-
border financial institutions:
• First, to establish how national authorities in dif-
ferent jurisdictions can work together to ensure
that large international financial organisations can
be regulated and supervised efficiently and effec-
tively in order to reduce the chance of financial
problems
• Second,to improve how these national authorities
can work together to resolve any problems that do
occur.
A third issue is to ask how such joint work can be or-
ganised.
Most attention has been placed on the first of these
issues and there have been a number of proposals al-
ready on how to proceed, the foremost of which in
Europe is the report of the de Larosière Group
(2009),which suggests a strengthening of the existing
arrangements at two levels:first the creation of clear
arrangements for improved macro-prudential super-
vision led by the ECB (a European Systemic Risk
Council) and second improved co-ordination of mi-
cro-prudential supervision through each of the three
“level 3” committees, CEBS, CESR and CEIOPS,
which would be turned into authorities with increased
powers:
• Legally binding mediation between national su-
pervisors
• Adoption of binding supervisory standards
• Adoption of binding technical decisions applicable
to individual institutions
• Oversight and co-ordination of colleges of super-
visors
• Licensing and supervision of specific EU-wide in-
stitutions (e.g., credit rating agencies and post-
trading infrastructure)
• Binding co-operation with the European Systemic
Risk Council over macro-prudential supervision
• Strong co-ordinating role in crisis situations.
Enhancing macro-prudential oversight is likely to be
non-contentious as it improves information for all
those involved. The ESCB is the obvious route for
such co-ordination since the principal players are the
central banks although at the national level the ef-
fectiveness of the arrangements will depend on the
powers assigned.
However,at the micro-prudential level there is some
dispute (Turner 2009,for example) over whether it is
best to treat the three sectors of banks,securities mar-
kets and insurance separately,when the trend in many
countries has been to amalgamate financial supervi-
sion into a single authority.Turner (2009) also has a
much milder view of the powers that should be as-
signed to a European level authority,making it an ad-
visory rather than an executive agency.
While greater harmonisation of regulation and greater
co-ordination among national supervisors will obvi-
ously help in improved cross-border arrangements it
is not clear that this is tackling the problem head on
and may be requiring substantial convergence of reg-
ulation where it is not essential.The large majority of
banks round the world are national and likely to re-
main so.They can therefore be adequately dealt with
by national arrangements reformed in the manner de-
scribed in the earlier sections of this article.The num-
ber of cross-border banks that are of systemic impor-
tance outside their home country in Europe is quite
small: 30-50 depending upon the definition used
(Schoenmaker and Oosterloo 2007).Their supervision
and regulation could indeed be dealt with through en-
hanced co-operation on an individual basis through su-
pervisory colleges led by the home country.Although
this will not cover the international banks that are not
primarily European in character – wider international
arrangements will still be needed.
An alternative solution, which has considerable at-
tractions, is to have a European level approach. One
approach is to have a European regulatory standard
that would be applied directly (Cihak and Decressin
2007),thus avoiding the need for national authorities
to change their own regulation. Nevertheless, having
such a European standard might lead to extensive
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convergence of national regulation as has been ob-
served in the US.
However, co-operation and co-ordination in good
times is the easier problem.Acting swiftly in a crisis
has proved much more difficult.The experience with
the three main Icelandic banks exposes some of the
problems. First of all, the home authority must have
both the power and the resources to address prob-
lems in the parent group and its branches. The
Icelandic authorities simply could not manage to pay-
out all insured depositors. This does not require a
change in structures of supervision and regulation but
a firmer decision on what structures of financial in-
stitutions are acceptable across Europe.Within indi-
vidual countries more thought should be given to the
monopoly (anti-trust) concerns to ensure that all fi-
nancial institutions are capable of being resolved in a
crisis (Stern and Feldman 2004).
Second the lead authority must be able to compel
rapid action among the authorities in the group.Here,
however there is a clear problem of mismatch be-
tween authorities.It is resolution authorities that are
involved in resolving problems, and they may not be
the same as the supervisors. For a structure to work
well in a hurry it must be simple.Thus if one wanted
a European level or international body, one respon-
sible for resolution might be the best place to start
rather than one for supervision.
The BIS (2008) is making a good start on identifying
the main problems amd what needs to be done.
National authorities would not simply need similar
powers so that prompt corrective action and early
resolution could be applied to a group but they
would have to be able to act in the interests of the
group as a whole,taking account of the systemic con-
sequences of disorderly action, particularly in small
countries dominated by foreign-owned banks. The
objectives under the new UK Banking Act 2009 re-
late entirely to the UK and would therefore be at
variance if another country in the group had a
greater problem. The relationship between New
Zealand and Australia illustrates how a workable
system can be designed.All the main banks in New
Zealand are Australian owned, but to enable New
Zealand to act to maintain financial stability in a cri-
sis they do not merely have to have the appropriate
legal structure – to be properly capitalised sub-
sidiaries – they also have to be capable of operating
on their own,within a day,in the event of a problem.
Thus if national authorities have a structure where
they can each act to safeguard their financial stabil-
ity,the cross-border system will work,as has been il-
lustrated in the crisis by the case of Fortis.Operating
a genuinely cross-border system without a division of
responsibilities on national lines presents much
greater problems.
The European Commission has recognised that the
best way to tackle problems in financial institutions
is to detect them early and act rapidly,and is prepar-
ing a White Paper on the topic to be published in the
middle of 2009. However, the initial lists of differ-
ences in powers and tools collected by CEBS (2009)
is daunting.To this must be added the further differ-
ences in a wider international context, including ac-
counting rules and major aspects of insolvency such
as the application of territoriality rather than univer-
sality that is applied to groups in the EU.
In a national environment it is possible to specify
quite simply what the objective should be in organis-
ing a resolution and how conflicts should be resolved.
This is no longer true in a cross-border context as
those with countries with greater problems deserve a
greater focus.It is thus difficult to provide an ex ante
agreement but agreements at the time may be too dif-
ficult to organise in the limited time available.
It would be nice to be optimistic but history is not
promising. It is well worth noting the remarks of the
sceptics and seeking to make sure that their views
prove mistaken.Kay (2009) provides an excellent ex-
ample:“The likely outcome of present discussions is
that everyone will agree they will regulate better and
that there should be more co-operation between na-
tional regulators.This might prevent anything like the
Icelandic problem occurring again. It is more likely
that the tooth fairy will agree to provide compensa-
tion for future bank failures.”
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